Termo de Fomento and Termo de Colaboração: The MROSC (Brazil’s Regulatory Framework for Civil Society Organizations) in Practice

This page is a translation of the original Portuguese text, provided for convenience. It deals with Brazilian law. If there is any discrepancy, the Portuguese version prevails. Read the original in Portuguese

Brazil’s Regulatory Framework for Civil Society Organizations separates the termo de colaboração (collaboration agreement) from the termo de fomento (fomento agreement) by a single criterion: who authored the work plan. That definition determines the public call for proposals (chamamento público), the organization’s eligibility, and how accountability reporting is designed.

Who Originated the Work Plan

Law 13.019/2014 brought partnerships between the public administration and civil society organizations under a single regime. Before it, the convênio (a cooperation agreement) served as an all-purpose instrument, and administrative practice had to live with requirements scattered across sector-specific rules. The text applied today comes largely from the reform enacted by Law 13.204/2015, which rewrote the very provisions that define each instrument.

The difference between a collaboration agreement and a fomento agreement does not lie in the amount transferred, the subject matter of the partnership, or the size of the partner organization. It lies in who authored the proposal. Art. 16 reserves the collaboration agreement for work plans initiated by the public administration itself. Art. 17 assigns the fomento agreement to work plans proposed by civil society organizations.

The definitions in Art. 2º confirm this design. Item VII covers partnerships proposed by the public administration, and item VIII covers partnerships proposed by the organizations. Both assume a transfer of financial resources, and both received their current wording from the same 2015 reform.

There is a third instrument, one that often goes unnoticed in routine practice guides. Item VIII-A of Art. 2º, added by that reform, created the cooperation agreement for partnerships that involve no transfer of financial resources. Granting the use of public property, reciprocal institutional support, and joint action without funding all fit within this framework, which dispenses with the entire financial machinery of the other two agreements.

The practical test for choosing between the first two is straightforward: who wrote the diagnosis and conceived the goals? If the government identified the problem, shaped the solution, and went looking for someone to carry it out, the collaboration agreement is the right path. If the organization arrived with its own project, born of its reading of local conditions, the fomento agreement is the appropriate instrument.

Choosing the wrong instrument is not a merely formal defect. When the administration formalizes as a fomento agreement a plan it designed itself, it inverts the logic of initiative set by the law and weakens its justification for choosing that particular partner. The reverse mistake, labeling as collaboration a project that originated in the organization, tends to hollow out the autonomy that the fomento agreement is meant to protect.

The sole paragraph of Art. 16 adds an intermediate route that is seldom used. Public policy councils may submit proposals to the administration so that it enters into a collaboration agreement with civil society organizations. The initiative remains public, even though it was prompted by the sector council, which preserves the coherence of the instrument without closing the door to public participation in shaping policy.

The Work Plan Decides the Partnership’s Fate

Both agreements rest on a work plan, and Art. 22 sets the minimum content of that document: a description of the reality the partnership addresses and its link to the intended goals, the goals to be reached through the activities or projects, the projected revenues and expenses, the method of execution, and the parameters for measuring whether the goals have been met.

In day-to-day administration, the element that most often undermines partnerships is the last one. Goals written without a verifiable indicator turn accountability reporting into a subjective argument, because neither party can objectively show what was achieved. A service goal that does not define what counts as service, a training goal with no number of hours, and a coordination goal with no expected deliverable all produce exactly this deadlock.

The link between diagnosis and goal serves a similar function. A plan that describes local conditions in generic terms and then proposes goals disconnected from that description fails the coherence the provision requires, and the flaw resurfaces in the technical opinion, in the manager’s review, and later in the examination of the accounts.

Projecting revenues and expenses calls for extra care when the organization contributes matching funds or has resources from other sources. Mixing sources without separate accounting makes it harder to prove later that public money paid for exactly what the plan promised to deliver.

The method of execution, for its part, tends to be treated as a formality, and rarely is one. It sets the timeline, the division of tasks between the parties, and the delivery milestones. A partnership whose timeline ignores the seasonality of the service or the calendar of fund transfers starts out misaligned, and no amount of good intentions fixes that during execution.

Public Call, Waiver, and Non-Requirement

Once the type of agreement is settled, the next step is choosing the organization. Art. 24 provides that, except in the cases set out in the law itself, a collaboration agreement or fomento agreement must be preceded by a public call for proposals to select civil society organizations.

The rule covers both instruments, including the fomento agreement. This point causes recurring confusion: the fact that the proposal originated with the organization does not automatically entitle it to receive public funds without competition. Private initiative for the project and public selection of the partner are separate decisions, governed by separate logics.

A proposal that originates with the organization does not remove the need for public selection of the partner: initiative and selection are separate decisions under the law.

Exceptions exist, but they are narrowly defined. Art. 30 allows the public call to be waived in urgent situations arising from the stoppage of an activity of significant public interest, for a limited period; in cases of war, public calamity, or serious disruption of public order; to protect people under threat; and for education, health, or social assistance activities, provided the organization has been accredited beforehand.

Art. 31 deals with a different kind of situation, non-requirement (inexigibilidade), which applies when competition is unfeasible. Examples include a subject matter arising from an international agreement or commitment, and a transfer authorized by a law that names the beneficiary organization.

The difference between the two provisions has real practical consequences. A waiver assumes that competition is possible but yields to the concrete situation; non-requirement starts from the logical impossibility of competing. Mismatched classifications frequently show up in findings by oversight bodies, and a written justification prepared at the time of the decision is what separates a legitimate choice from a vulnerable one.

It is worth noting that the public call is not a bureaucratic obstacle to partnership. It is the procedure that gives the choice its foundation. A well-built notice, with judging criteria known in advance, reduces challenges and protects both the public manager and the winning organization from later questions about the merits of the selection.

Qualifying the Organization Before Signing

Art. 33 lists the requirements an organization must meet in order to enter into the partnership. Among them is the time requirement in item V, subitem (a): a minimum period of existence, ranging from one to three years depending on the level of government at which the partnership is entered into, with an active registration proven by documentation issued by the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service based on the National Registry of Legal Entities.

The scale is not arbitrary. It recognizes that a municipal partnership reaches smaller and newer organizations, while broader levels of government deal with organizations of greater institutional maturity. The subitem itself allows the government entity to shorten the period by a specific act when no organization in its territory meets it, which avoids making public policy unworkable in regions where civil society is still emerging.

The remaining requirements address statutory purposes compatible with the subject of the partnership, prior experience in the intended activity, and the minimum structure needed to carry out the plan submitted. Document checks come before signing, and an expired certificate at this stage often stalls partnerships that have already been approved on their technical merits.

One practical point: qualification examines the organization, not the project. A sound organization with a poorly drafted plan, and a strong plan from a disqualified organization, are problems of different kinds, and each is resolved at its own stage. Confusing the two analyses delays the signing and produces poorly grounded decisions.

Execution, Monitoring, and Accountability Reporting

Once the agreement is signed, the partnership enters the phase in which most disputes arise. The law structures oversight along two complementary lines: monitoring of execution throughout the term, and accountability reporting focused on whether the goals agreed in the work plan were met.

This shift in the focus of review is the hallmark of the regime. The examination does not end with checking invoices; it asks whether the subject matter was performed and the goals were reached. An execution report that describes activities without measuring them against the approved goals leaves the administration without grounds to approve the accounts, even if every expense is fully documented.

That is why the measurement parameter drafted at the start of the partnership matters: it bears on the outcome again at the end. An organization that negotiated clear indicators arrives at the accountability stage with its demonstration practically ready. One that accepted vague goals finds out too late that it cannot prove something that was never precisely defined.

The legislation provides consequences for noncompliance, on a scale that runs from a warning to more severe measures, and it governs responsibility for funds spent contrary to what was agreed. Public managers and organization leaders are better off treating the work plan as a living execution document, consulted throughout the term, rather than as a file put away right after signing.

The 2015 reform and later adjustments, including the amendment made by Law 14.309/2022, preserved this results-oriented design of oversight. Those who work on either side of the partnership face fewer conceptual questions in daily practice and more recordkeeping demands: measurable goals, organized documentation, and written justifications prepared at the moment a decision is made.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can an organization propose a project and receive funds without a public call for proposals?

A proposal initiated by the organization is formalized through a fomento agreement, under Art. 17, but that alone does not remove the public call provided for in Art. 24. The waiver in Art. 30 and the non-requirement in Art. 31 depend on fitting specific scenarios, with an express justification in the case file. Without that fit, public selection remains mandatory.

Which instrument applies when the partnership involves no transfer of money?

The cooperation agreement, provided for in item VIII-A of Art. 2º. The 2015 reform added it precisely for partnerships without a transfer of financial resources, such as granting the use of public property and institutional joint action. Collaboration agreements and fomento agreements assume a transfer of funds and therefore do not serve this purpose.

Can the organization’s minimum period of existence be shortened?

Yes. Subitem (a) of item V of Art. 33, which sets the time requirement, authorizes the government entity to shorten the period by a specific act when no organization in its territory reaches the required period. The reduction depends on a formal, general decision by the entity, not on waiving the requirement for an individual organization in a particular case.

As informações deste artigo são de caráter informativo e não substituem consulta jurídica individualizada. Cada caso possui particularidades que exigem análise específica.